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GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS LAWS: MYTHS AND MYTHOS*
MARK DAVIES*
I.

INTRODUCTION: DEMYTHOLOGIZING GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS LAWS

Some years ago, it was fashionable among theologians to speak of
"demythologizing" the Bible, 1 an unfortunate and controversial phrase
that described an essential and common practice: to separate the eternally
true from the literally true, to find the essence of faith among the
trappings of a particular time and culture. 2
Governmental ethicists must do precisely that with ethics laws: they
must demythologize them. They must separate the wheat of first
principles from the chaff of political realities, public pressure, and
bureaucratic inertia. Thus, when ethicists find themselves arguing over
this comma or that, like a couple of theologians fighting over whether the
tree in the Garden of Eden was a Winesap or a MacIntosh, they need to
step back, take a deep breath, and undertake a little self-analysis and
renewal.
II. FUNDAMENTAL AsSUMPTIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS LAWS
The genesis of much of the myth surrounding governmental ethics
laws lies in a misconception as to their purpose and bases. Thus, one
must first lay out five fundamental assumptions underlying those laws.
Assumption No. 1. The primary purpose of governmental ethics laws
is to improve honesty and integrity in government. It is not to collect
forms, hand out fines, or publish rules and opinions. Those activities can
be important, but only to the extent that they improve integrity in
government. Two corollaries accompany this assumption. One, the
prevention of unethical conduct does far more for integrity in government
than the punishment of unethical conduct. It is better to shut the barn
* This essay is based on a speech delivered by the author at the international
conference of the Council on Governmental Ethics Laws in Honolulu, Hawaii, December
4-7, 1994. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Conflicts of Interest Board.
** Executive Director/Counsel, New York City Conflicts of Interest Board.
1. The German scholar Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976) is perhaps best known for
this approach. See William W. Quinn, Jr., Rudolf Bultmann's "Demythologization"
Hermeneutic as Applied to New Testament and ConstitutionalExegesis, 6 J.L. & REL.
297 (1988).
2. See id. at 303 (discussing Bultmann's attempts to ascertain the "true" meaning
of the New Testament through "demythologization").
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door before the horse has bolted. Two, the perception of integrity in
government is no less important than the reality of integrity in
government. Both are essential because regardless of how honest public
officials are in fact, a democratic system of government cannot function
properly if the public believes its officials are corrupt.3
Assumption No. 2. The vast majority of public officials are honest
and want to do the right thing. For example, the city of New York has
over 200,000 employees,' yet only a small fraction has ever proven to be
corrupt.
From this second assumption arise two corollaries. One, the vast
majority of conduct that is unethical under the law results from employees'
ignorance of what the law is. For this reason, training and education are
the most important responsibilities of an ethics agency. Two, ethics laws
must not place on officials the entire burden of ensuring government
integrity. Vendors, developers, and applicants should all have a stake in
officials complying with ethics laws. But the reality is more like this: a
village treasurer gets a little jammed up financially, with tuition bills, a
sick parent, a broken down car. Along comes the local bank that hopes
to keep the village's business and gives the treasurer a loan at a couple of
points below the usual interest rate. Since no bribe is offered, nothing
happens to the bank; but the treasurer may well lose his job. That
disparity is grossly unjust.
Assumption No. 3. Officials cannot obey an ethics law they do not
understand. And the vast majority of government employees are lay
persons with limited access to attorneys. Therefore, ethics codes must be
clear, comprehensive, short, simple, and straightforward. To quote the
trial lawyers, KISS-Keep It Simple, Stupid. Moreover, whenever
possible, ethics codes should contain bright-line rules and never threearmed lawyer gobbledygook-that is, on the one hand this, on one the
other hand that, and on the third hand something else. Yet, one New
3. See Deborah L. Markowitz, A Crisis in Confidence: Municipal Officials Under
Fire, 16 VT. L. REV. 579, 579-82 (1992):
The proper operation of democratic government requires that public officials
and employees be independent, impartial and responsible to the people; that
government decisions and policy be made in proper channels of the
governmental structure; that public office not be used for personal gain; and
that the public have confidence in the integrity of government.
Id. at 579 (quoting Rutland, Vt., Code of Ethics § 451 (1982)). See generallyArchibald
Cox, Ethics in Government: The Cornerstoneof Public Trust, 94 W. VA. L. REv. 281
(1991-92).
4. The estimated number of filled, full-time positions as of June 30, 1995, was
228,037. THE 1994-95 GREEN BOOK:
YORK 616-17 (1994).
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York State ethics provision5 contains fifteen exceptions, with exceptions
to the exceptions. 6 No ethics provision should require fifteen exceptions.
5. See N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 801 (MeKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995) (Conflicts of
Interest Prohibited).
6. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAWv § 802 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995). The statute
reads as follows:
The provisions of section eight hundred one of this chapter shall not apply
to:
1. a. The designation of a bank or trust company as a depository, paying
agent, registration agent or for investment of funds of a municipality except
when the chief fiscal officer, treasurer, or his deputy or employee, has an
interest in such bank or trust company; provided, however, that where
designation of a bank or trust company outside the municipality would be
required because of the foregoing restriction, a bank or trust company within
the municipality may nevertheless be so designated;
b. A contract with a person, firm, corporation or association in which a
municipal officer or employee has an interest which is prohibited solely by
reason of employment as an officer or employee thereof, if the remuneration
of such employment will not be directly affected as a result of such contract
and the duties of such employment do not directly involve the procurement,
preparation or performance of any part of such contract;
c. The designation of a newspaper, including but not limited to an official
newspaper, for the publication of any notice, resolution, ordinance or other
proceeding where such publication is required or authorized by law;
d. The purchase by a municipality of real property or an interest therein,
provided the purchase and the consideration therefor is approved by order of
the supreme court upon petition of the governing board;
e. The acquisition of real property or an interest therein, through
condemnation proceedings according to law;
f. A contract with a membership corporation or other voluntary non-profit
corporation or association;
g. The sale of bonds and notes pursuant to section 60.10 of the local finance
law;
h. A contract in which a municipal officer or employee has an interest if
such contract was entered into prior to the time he was elected or appointed
as such officer or employee, but this paragraph shall in no event authorize a
renewal of such contract;
i. Employment of a duly licensed physician as school physician for a school
district upon authorization by a two-thirds vote of the board of education of
such school district, notwithstanding the fact that such physician shall have an
interest, as defined in section eight hundred one of this chapter, in such
employment.
2. a. A contract with a corporation in which a municipal officer or
employee has an interest by reason of stockholdings when less than five per
centum of the outstanding stock of the corporation is owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by such officer or employee;

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

Furthermore, public officials must have easy access to guidance on
ethics laws and quick answers to ethics questions. Public servants do not
want analysis but answers; and, whenever possible, they want those
answers not next month or next year but immediately, or at least within
a few days.
Assumption No. 4. Officials will not obey, or will only grudgingly
obey, an ethics law that does not make sense to them. In ethics, common
sense is king. That is why public officials favor transactional disclosure
(disclosure of a conflict when it actually arises) over annual disclosure:

transactional disclosure makes sense to them.7 Yet when an ethics law
defines as unethical something that most people do not regard as unethical,
that ethics law spawns "unethical" conduct.
From this fourth assumption, two corollaries arise. One, ethics

regulations must always be written and interpreted in light of reason,
common sense, and everyday experience.

An ethics code is not the

Internal Revenue Code but rather a collection of general principles
governing human conduct in a rather fuzzy area.
Furthermore, in drafting an ethics law, legislators must know their

customer. They must draft the law to reflect the size and nature of the
particular governmental entity and the sophistication of its employees and
constituents. An ethics provision that is good for a state or a major city
may devastate a small municipality. What is good for the goose is not
necessarily good for the gander. For example, in New York, a largely
b. A contract for the furnishing of public utility services when the rates or
charges therefor are fixed or regulated by the public service commission;
a. A contract for the payment of a reasonable rental of a room or rooms
owned or leased by an officer or employee when the same are used in the
performance of his official duties and are so designated as an office or
chamber;
d. A contract for the payment of a portion of the compensation of a private
employee of an officer when such employee performs part time service in the
official duties of the office;
e. A contract in which a municipal officer or employee has an interest if the
total consideration payable thereunder, when added to the aggregate amount
of all consideration payable un'der contracts in which such person had an
interest during the fiscal year, does not exceed the sum of one hundred dollars;
f. A contract with a member of a private industry council established in
accordance with the federal job training partnership act [29 U.S.C.A. §1501
et seq.] or any firm, corporation or association in which such member holds
an interest, provided the member discloses such interest to the council and the
member does not vote on the contract.
Id.
7. See generallyMark Davies, 1987Ethicsin GovernmentAct: FinancialDisclosure
ProvisionsforMunicipal Officials and ProposalsforReform, 11 PACE L. REV. 243,24657 (1991) (discussing the annual disclosure requirements under New York law).
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rural state, small communities depend heavily upon volunteers for
municipal officials,'

who meet only monthly, who are independent but

sometimes not terribly sophisticated, who are known by everyone in the

community, who cherish their privacy, and who have little money for
expensive state mandates. 9 Those facts explain why lengthy financial
disclosure forms are unneeded anathema in these communities, why a
"two-hats" provision prohibiting a public official from holding a political
office is unworkable (there are simply not enough volunteers to go

around),1" why broad "revolving door" restrictions will probably keep

some of the best people out of local government, and why a sensible code
of ethics is critical, as conflicts of interest in small communities are
virtually unavoidable.
Good government requires good people in government. Yet when
ethics laws become so onerous that good citizens refuse to serve, 1 or
when ethics laws become so convoluted or so divorced from common
sense that government officials unwittingly violate them or knowingly
ignore them, then ethics laws promote unethical conduct and foster bad
government. The bottom line is this: ethics regulations must encourage,
not discourage, good citizens from serving in government. If they do not
do that, they have failed and belong in the rubbish heap.
8. See Sydney Duncombe, Volunteers in City Government: Getting More than Your
Money's Worth, 75 NAT'L CIvic REv. 291 (1986); Sydney Duncombe, Volunteers in
City Government: Advantages, Disadvantages and Uses, 74 NAT'L CivIC REv. 356
(1985); William D. Duncombe & Jeffrey L. Brudney, The OptimalMix of Volunteer and
PaidStaff in Local Governments:AnApplication to MunicipalFireDepartments,23 PUB.
FIN. Q. 356 (1995); Sandra Reinsel Markwood, Volunteers in Local Government:
Partners in Service, 76 PuB. MGMT. 6 (1994); Ina Aronow, Two Small Villages, A
Century Old and Content, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 11, 1991, § 12 (Westchester County), at
1 (discussing the operations of two small villages in Westchester County, New York,
including volunteers in local government).
9. See Aronow, supra note 8.
10. See Elizabeth Kolbert, Loss of Members ForcesSuburban Volunteer Groups to
Change Strategies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1986, at B4 (regarding the shrinking pool of
volunteers as more women work full-time and more men and women work longer hours);
see also Jeffrey L. Brudney, The Availability of Volunteers: Implications for Local
Governments, 21 ADMIN. & SOC'Y 413 (1990).
11. See Thomas G. Scott, If You Work for the Government, You Must Disclose
Finances;Government Ruling on Public Officials' FinancialDisclosure, 7 Bus. FIRST OF
BUFFALO 1 (1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEAST file (discussing the
negative responses of some New York state local government officials to the financial
disclosurerequirements of the 1987 Ethics in Government Act); Jay Romano, New Ethics
Law is Called Obstaclefor Local Officials, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1991, § 12 (New
Jersey), at 1 (explaining New Jersey's then-new ethics law and the effect on volunteers).
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Assumption No. 5. Unless an army of investigators is to be hired,
enforcement of ethics laws must depend primarily upon self-interest, peer
pressure, whistle blowers, concerned citizens, and the media. These are
the enforcers of ethics laws-not inspectors general, not district attorneys,
and not even ethics commissions.
Accordingly, ethics laws must be simple and inexpensive to administer
and enforce, and they must be flexible.
Certainly the last thing
municipalities need is yet another expensive, inflexible government
mandate. Further, the best enforcement is local enforcement, provided it
is even-handed and effective. The principles of home rule, the limits of
ethics commissions' budgets, and the greater knowledge that officials and
citizens at the agency or local level have of their own needs, all dictate
that an ethics commission intervene in the enforcement of ethics laws only
when local or agency enforcement fails.
Ethics commissions should
oversee, not implement, the enforcement of ethics laws.
I.

THE

FUNDAMENTAL NATURE

OF ETHics LAWS

Applying these assumptions to an analysis of the nature and structure
of ethics regulations and ethics commissions leads one to analogize ethics
laws to a three-legged stool, resting upon a code of ethics, disclosure, and
enforcement.12 If any of these legs is removed, the stool topples.
A. Code of Ethics
A code of ethics must contain a clear and comprehensive list of do's
and don'ts. Simple, straightforward, sensible, and short, such a code will
not only guide officials but also protect them against an outside employer
or relative who asks the official for a favor. For example, when requested
by an employer or relative to help him or her obtain a contract with the
official's village, the official can reply, "I'm sorry, I wish I could help,
but look at what the code of ethics says; I can't do it." The ethics code
must also have definitions that narrow the scope of ethics rules, never
expand them. Thus, if officials read nothing but the code of ethics and
follow it, they will not go astray.
Unfortunately, most ethics laws fail to meet these basic requirements,
as the following example illustrates. A partner in a small, local moving
firm, who lives in a rural, upstate New York village, serves on the village
12. See generally New York State Temporary State Commission on Local
Government Ethics, Final Report, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1993); Mark Davies,
Keeping the Faith:A Model Local Ethics Law-Content and Commentary, 21 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 61 (1993); Mark Davies, New Municipal Ethics Law Proposed, 5 MUN.
LAW., March/April 1991, at 1.
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board of trustees. The person in charge of village buildings, who is
appointed by the village board, hires the moving firm to move a piano and
some other heavy furniture out of village hall at a cost of $350. The
partner-trustee has nothing whatsoever to do with the contract, either for
the firm or the village-complete recusal. Moreover, to be on the safe
side, she informs the village clerk in writing of these facts and also
informs her partner that 100% of the profit from the contract must go to
him-that the partner-trustee will not profit one nickel from any village
business. Although one would think that, by taking these precautions, the
trustee would have complied with any ethics rules, in fact the trustee had
better pack her toothbrush because she has just committed a crime, a
misdemeanor. 13 Under the definition of "interest"1 4 she is deemed to
have a prohibited interest in the contract because she is part owner of a
firm that receives money from the contract, even though she herself
receives no money."5 Moreover, none of the fifteen exceptions to this
rule applies."6 Furthermore, the contract is "null, void and wholly
unenforceable"-a totally inflexible fiat. 7 Thus, the trustee's village will
have to go to a moving company 40 miles down the road and pay twice
the price to move that furniture. Too bad, so sad, says current New York
State law.
One town in New York had to truck its bulk trash (like old washing
machines) to another state because the local landfill was owned by a
member of the town board."5 And at his former commission, this author
once received a call from an enthusiastic, newly-elected town legislator,
13. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAv 3§ 800(3)(b)-(d), 801, 805 (McKinney 1986 &

Supp. 1995). See also OP. ST. CoMnT. No. 89-39 (1989) (quoting N.Y. GEN. MUN.
LAW, § 800(3)(b), (c), (d) ("[R]egardless of whether an officer or employee receives a
direct or indirect pecuniary benefit from a contract, an officer or employee is deemed to
have an interest in any contract of a firm, partnership or association of which the officer
or employee is an employee, or in any contract of a corporation of which he is an
officer, director, employee, or stockholder . . ." (emphasis in original));

OP. ST.

COMrPT. No. 80-623 (1980) ("A member of a village board of trustees has a prohibited
conflict of interest if a firm of which he is a member sells supplies to the village.").
14. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAWv § 800(3) (defining "Interest").
15. See id. § 801 (prohibiting conflicts of interest).
16. See id. §§ 800(3), 802.
17. See id. § 804 (McKinney 1986).
18. See also 15 OP. ST. COMT. 35 (1959) ("A town may not contract for repair
work with a firm in which the town clerk is a partner, even though it is the only
authorized repair service in the area."); 17 OP. ST. COMPT. 88 (1961) ("A village
trustee may not be an officer of a private corporation which contracts with such village.
If he wishes to retain both positions, official and private, the corporation must not enter
into further contracts with the village.").
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who said her husband was the only insurance agent in town and had had
the town's insurance business for years. She asked if that contract would
present any problem if she recused herself from any matter relating to the
town's insurance. Unfortunately, unless she were to resign her position
on the town board or her husband were to give up the town's insurance
business when it came up for renewal, she would commit a crime. 19
Communities like this face Hobson's choice: either they violate the
law or they lose an official who is difficult to replace or they pay
substantially more for services from a non-official located many miles
away. One must question whether these results promote honesty and
integrity in government, whether they foster respect for the ethics law, or
whether the legislators, in drafting these laws, knew their customers,
these small, rural communities. Moreover, beyond a shadow of a doubt,
these ethics provisions squander precious municipal resources. To
paraphrase Mr. Bumble, if that's the law, then the law is an ass.'
Similarly, the New York State gifts law for municipal officials
prohibits gifts worth $75 or more, "under circumstances in which it could
reasonably be inferred that the gift was intended to influence the
official."21 One seeks in vain to divine the meaning of this provision, to
determine whether one may accept the gift or not. Officials need answers,
not "reasonably be inferred" gibberish.
Ethics laws that are long or complex or that cannot be understood or
do not make sense to the average official are noi merely flawed, they are
bad laws. And a bad ethics law is worse than no ethics law at all because
it raises expectations it cannot meet and condemns officials to ethical
violations, thereby undermining citizens' trust and confidence in the
integrity and effectiveness of their government.
B. Disclosure
The second leg of the ethics stool is disclosure: transactional
disclosure, applicant disclosure, and annual disclosure.'
Rarely does
one meet an official who objects to transactional disclosure-that is,
disclosure and recusal when a conflict actually arises. Transactional
19. See N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW §§ 801,805. Note that, at the same time, under the
New York State ethics law, the town attorney could represent private clients before the
town's zoning board. See id., §§ 801, 805-a.
20. See CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 399 (Oxford University Press 1987)

(1838).
21. See N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 805-a(1). But see People v. Moore, 377
N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1008 (Fulton County Ct. 1975) (holding the reasonable inference
provision to be unconstitutionally vague).
22. See Davies, supra note 7, at 260-62.
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disclosure is pinpoint dislosure-"I'd like to state for the record that I am
employed by the applicant for this zoning variance, and I therefore recuse
myself from taking part in this matter."
Disclosure by bidders or applicants of the interest of any officials in
the bid or application also presents little problem. But annual financial
disclosure justifiably raises a fire storm among officials. 3
Every ethics commission employee has heard it: how many people
report bribes on their financial disclosure forms? None. That answer is
hardly suprising since, as governmental ethicists uniformly agree, the
purpose of financial disclosure is not to catch crooks. However, the
question is quite revealing because it demonstrates that the public has been
sold a bill of goods on financial disclosure. Disclosure forms are not the
magic bullet that will cure all ethical ills. Indeed, too often these forms
are used by elected officials as a smoke screen to make the public think
they have done something about ethics when, in fact, they have not. Long
financial disclosure forms can never replace a tough code of ethics with
full transactional disclosure, enforced by a well-financed ethics
commission with real teeth.'
Such forms provide a lot of paper for
people to push, but they do not do much to improve officials' ethics.
They do, however, drive volunteers out of government, particularly in
smaller communities. In New York State almost 300 county volunteer
board members resigned when lengthy financial disclosure became
effective.- 5 Even at the state level excessive financial disclosure impedes
the recruitment of qualified appointees. For example, an article in The
Honolulu Advertiser described then Governor-elect Cayetano's problem in
filling cabinet posts: "[T]he task of filling 40 cabinet positions is proving
touchy. At $85,000 a year, cabinet posts pay far less than jobs in the
private sector. Prospective appointees are also daunted by the state's
financial disclosure laws, and the chance of losing ground in the office
hierarchy by taking a limited-term appointment in the public sector. "I
Yet one should not conclude that annual disclosure serves no purpose.
It does serve a purpose, at least if the forms are tailored to the filer's
position and agency. Annual disclosure focuses the official's and the
public's attention at least once a year upon potential conflicts of interest
before they occur and thereby, one hopes, prevents those conflicts from
23. See id.
24. Compare the terminally anemic New York State ethics laws for municipal
officials outside New York City with New York City's tough ethics law. N.Y. GEN.
MUN. LAW, art. 18, § 800 et. seq. (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. CrrY
CHARTER ch. 68 (1992).
25. See Aronow, supra note 8.
26. Ann Botticelli, Cayetano's Challenge: Break with 'Old Boys,' HONOLULU
ADvERTIsER, Dec. 4, 1994, at Al, A2 (emphasis added).
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actually happening or at least minimizes them when they do happen.
However, fulfilling that purpose does not require lengthy disclosure,
except perhaps for certain officials in the largest state or municipal
governments. Annual disclosure forms are like zucchini: more and bigger
is not necessarily better.
Furthermore, if ethics laws are to be enforced primarily by the public
and the media, then disclosure forms should be completely open to the
public. A disclosure form that is not disclosed serves little purpose, other
than gathering dust in a back room or perhaps, one day providing another
arrow in a district attorney's quiver. If prosecutors want disclosure
forms, then let prosecutors collect and pay for them.
Indeed, to be usable at all, disclosure forms must be computerized,
because they reveal conflicts of interest only upon comparison with other
data, such as lists of vendors to the governmental entity. Electronic filing
is thus not merely the wave of the future; it is the only future for annual
disclosure.
C. Enforcement
Finally, the third leg is enforcement. It is embarrassing to talk about
enforcement because enforcement actions and fines are not an ethics
commission's successes; they are its failures.
Every enforcement
proceeding an ethics commission undertakes, every fine it imposes, is an
indictment of that agency for failing to teach that official what the law is
or for failing to convince him or her to obey it.
Nevertheless,
enforcement will always exist, and ethics agencies must have aggressive
enforcement programs.
Yet, above all, it is training, education, and advice, both written and
oral, not enforcement, that prevents unethical conduct before it occurs.
Indeed, every ethics commission must convince its public officials that its
purpose is not to whack them but to help them-to protect them against
unscrupulous vendors and overbearing superiors, to guide them through
the ethical jungle, and to stand up for them against self-proclaimed ethics
experts and misguided citizens who accuse the officials of unspecified
ethics violations.
Ethics commissions also need to focus far more on what officials may
do and less on what they may not do, that is, these commissions must
offer more carrot and less stick. Perhaps it would not be inappropriate to
issue a rule permitting government employees to copy their personal tax
returns and their medical forms on office photocopiers or to use their
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office computer to type the minutes of their PTA meeting, provided they
supply their own paper and do it on their own time 27
IV. CONCLUSION: A TASTE FOR THE TEUTONIC
Consonant with their mission and as a concession to political reality,
ethics agencies must always reflect not a bloated bureaucracy but a lean,
though not cadaverous, machine. To quote New York City's Parks
Commissioner, Henry J. Stern, there had been so many budget cuts, "it's
like giving liposuction to a skeleton."'

Ethics commissions must face the fact that they are only a gnat on a
dinosaur. Yet these commissions must nevertheless convince their elected
officials that unethical conduct costs money and that, as money becomes
tighter, unethical shortcuts become ever more enticing. Consequently, the

threats to ethics, and the corresponding need for strengthened ethics
agencies, becomes greater.

Witness the New York State legislature's

recent attempt, initially vetoed by Governor Pataki, to suspend the

"revolving door" provisions of State law during a budget crisis; to lay off
state employees but cut them a break on ethics.29
Money, it is said, cannot buy happiness; but it can buy more ethical

government. Training, education, and quick advice to government
employees, all of which cost money, mean fewer ethical lapses. It has
even been suggested that this country consider the German system of life
tenure and high pay for government officials in return for stringent ethical
standards. The previous quote from The Honolulu Advertiser illustrates
the impetus for such a proposal.'
27. During the discussion following this speech, one member of the audience
pointed out that permitting a public official to type PTA minutes would probably raise
few eyebrows but allowing him or her to type KKK minutes would create an uproar; and
the government may be constitutionally prohibited from distinguishing between the two.
This example illustrates the need for caution in permitting private use of government
equipment.
28. See Douglas Martin, Trying New Ways to Save Decaying Parks, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 1994, at Al, B4.
29. Tom Precious, Pataki Nudges Closed Revolving Door of State Jobs, TIMEs
UNIoN, Apr. 13, 1995 at B2. But see 1995 N.Y. Laws Ch. 299, amending N.Y. PUB.
OFF. LAW § 73(8) to exempt from the state's two-year revolving door bar certain New
York State employees who lost their jobs because of a reduction in the state work force;
Legis. Mem., 1995 N.Y. Laws A-728; Exec. Mem., 1995 N.Y. Laws A-945.
30. See Botticelli, supra note 26, at A2. ("Prospective appointees are also daunted
by . . . the chance of losing ground in the office hierarchy by taking a limited-term
appointment in the public sector.").
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The German system imposes upon higher-level public servants
(generally those with discretionary authority) substantial duties of service
and loyalty; but the duty of service is legally and financially secured by
an appointment for life, and the duty of loyalty requires that the
government provide for the welfare of the public official.3" The German
Constitution itself guarantees these rights to public officials and enshrines
in constitutional law the officials' independence in office.32
In short, officials' duties presuppose officials' rights. The German
model leads one to question whether Americans have any right to impose
stringent ethical obligations upon their public officials unless and until
those officials are granted reciprocal rights. Perhaps one even needs to
declare a moratorium on ethics laws until those rights have been secured,
remembering that "[o]f them has much been demanded. To them should
at least a little be given in return."33

31. See Mark Davies, The Public Administrative Law Context of Ethics
Requirementsfor West German andAmerican Public Officials: A ComparativeAnalysis,
18 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 319, 371-81 (1988) (discussing German constitutional
principles with regard to civil service employment and the duties of service and loyalty).
32. See id.
33. Id. at 390.

